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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this essay is to assess the automatic exchange of information as described in EU Directive 
2003/48 of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments with regard to the 
fundamental right of the individual to a private life, to banking secrecy and the freedoms on which the 
European internal market is based. 
  
The assessment reveals the conflicts of interests and values involved in the holding by banks (particularly 
those offering private banking services) of increasingly extensive, detailed and intimate information about 
their clients and in the automatic processing of that information by ever more powerful and sophisticated 
systems. 
  
Banking secrecy plays an essential role in protecting clients against the dangers which the disclosure of 
such  information  without  their  permission  might  produce.  Banking  secrecy  exists  not  only  in 
Luxembourg but also in many other European countries, and in Germany and France in particular it is 
not  very  different  from  the  system  applying  in  Luxembourg.  While  the  French  and  German  tax 
authorities do have some investigative powers not enjoyed by their Luxembourg counterparts, those 
powers are strictly circumscribed and cannot rely on the electronic exchange of information set out in EU 
Directive 2003/48/EC.  
 
While banking secrecy is totally incompatible with the electronic exchange of information, the core 
question is whether the latter can be reconciled with the respect for private life. In a Europe that sets itself 
up as the cradle of human rights, the general and en-masse exchange of private information cannot provide 
adequate and sufficient guarantees that the information exchanged will not be misused.  The amount of 
interference in private life is clearly out of proportion to the public interest involved and is contrary to 
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sub-section  2,  article  8  of  the  European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and 
Fundamental Freedoms and to articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. 
 
Since the automatic exchange of information at least potentially risks restricting the free flow of capital 
among Member States and discouraging the use of transborder banking services, its compliance with the 
fundamental principles of the internal market also needs to be closely examined. The restrictions imposed 
by such exchange very probably go beyond the limits within which the free movement of capital and 
services is possible. The European Court of Justice has found that there is no proportionality if the 
measures supposedly undertaken in the general interest are actually based on a general presumption of tax 
evasion or tax fraud. However, it would be true to say that the ECJ does not always examine the tax 
restrictions placed on the free movement of capital particularly thoroughly to ensure that they are 
necessary or proportionate. 
 
The economic effectiveness of the automatic exchange of information is far from being proved and 
involves significant cost to the banks providing the information and to the tax authorities using it.  To 
date the system does not appear to have produced any significant new tax revenue nor does it prevent the 
continuing outflow of capital from Europe.  Yet withholding at source, which respects individual and 
economic freedoms, does generate tax revenue that is cost-free to the State. Exchange of information on 
request in justified cases using the OECD Tax Convention on Income and Capital model does also fight 
tax fraud while at the same time providing citizens with the guarantees required to ensure their private 
lives are respected. 
  
A combination of these two systems - withholding at source and exchange of information on request in 
justified  cases  -  would  create  the  proper  balance  between  the  public  and  private  interest  that  the 
automatic exchange of information cannot provide. 
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A.  Introduction 
  
To ensure that the interest received by an individual in a Member State in which he is not resident for tax 
purposes is taxed in accordance with the law of the Member State in which he is resident, EU Directive of 
3 June 2003 (Directive 2003/48 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments) 
envisages the automatic exchange of information between tax authorities in the Member States of the 
European Union. In the case of Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria however, the new system was 
replaced over a transitional period by withholding at source, the revenue being shared between the 
withholding Member State and the Member State in which the beneficiary of the interest is resident.  The 
transitional period will end in the manner set out in the Directive.  
 
The automatic exchange of information occurs automatically on an annual basis without any request by a 
Member State when specific details of individuals (their names, bank accounts and interest paid) is 
divulged.  This is usually confidential information that is protected and cannot be disclosed.  Confidential 
information cannot be divulged without the agreement of the individuals concerned. This leads to the 
question of whether the automatic exchange of information respects the right to a private life enshrined 
in the European Convention on Human Rights and protected by banking secrecy that the Member States 
recognise and protect. This is the question that we are addressing in the following as the transitional 
period is drawing to a close and before the automatic exchange of information becomes a general 
phenomenon. 
  
This is a delicate matter since the automatic and general exchange of information to the tax authorities 
appears to have a solid basis in the public interest. We also believe that the same interest would certainly 
justify the lifting of banking secrecy if this protected only the interests of those bound by it. But the 
question is actually less about banking secrecy and more about respect for private life, which is a 
fundamental right of all European citizens. Information must not be disclosed in any way that causes 
unlawful and disproportionate harm to private life.  Respect for private life must continue to form part of 
this debate. This fundamental right is as important for a democratic society to protect as those public 
interests that require the automatic and general disclosure of information. Those public interests must 
furthermore also be weighed against other public interests that such disclosure could harm (economic 
and social development as promoted in Europe through the single European market). 
  
We do not believe that any interest or value (cf. C., below) can be left out of this discussion. So the 
question is how to address them, and since countries are obviously entitled to collect the taxes they 
impose on the basis of fiscal justice, the question is whether respect for private life and the freedoms  
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underlying the single European market are best protected through the exchange of information or by the 
withholding at source allowed under the Directive of 3 June 2003 (D., below). To answer this question we 
must first look at the context (cf. the following sub B.).  
  
B.  The context  
  
The disclosure of information between authorities cannot be examined without considering the factual 
circumstances. We will therefore first consider the environment and then banking secrecy in particular. 
  
I.  General environment  
  
The fact that governments want information on their citizens is not new. The recent banking and 
financial crisis has made this desire even keener, as the declarations made by the G20 in March 2009 show.  
And these were not empty words. The French banks, for example, undertook to make available to their 
parent companies information on transactions and operations in an area that led the country to be ranked 
one of the least co-operative (Revue banque, June 2009, page 6). Yet we must not confuse tax havens with 
regulatory havens. Regulatory havens have little or no regulation of transactions while tax havens offer 
more attractive fiscal regimes to the wealthy.  Although attractive fiscal regimes did not cause the financial 
recession, lax regulation of transactions did contribute to it. 
  
The renewed interest in information held by third parties comes at a time when some of them (banks, 
investment companies) are accumulating increasing quantities of data.  
  
1.  Bankers - professional information holders  
  
The nature of banking means that banks also hold information on their clients (Court of Luxembourg, 24 
April 1991, p. 28, 173 "by profession, bankers must hold confidential information on their clients and 
third parties") concerning their assets and other matters. This applies to all banks, including those 
offering private banking services. 
  
All clients must provide their banks with huge amounts of information that touches on the most intimate 
aspects of their private lives. Their accounts show details not only of their assets but also of their standard 
of living, what they buy, where they go and generally on how they live. The asset management services 
they require of a private banker will often require them to disclose their most personal details since  
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without that information the banker will be quite simply unable to give them the professional advice and 
service they require. 
  
The same applies to all clients, wealthy or otherwise. Since all payments and deposits involve bank money, 
bankers hold large amounts of information on their clients. 
  
2.  The increasing amount of information held by banks 
  
The amount of information held by banks is growing. However this is not the banks' own choice: they do 
not want to know more and more about their clients. This is an obligation imposed on banks by 
government. 
  
The trend is rising, as evidenced by EU Directive 2004/39 of 21 April 2004 (on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of 
the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  repealing  Council  Directive  93/22/EEC)  which 
requires clients to be classified into a number of categories and their financial positions to be assessed so 
that they can be offered the most suitable products and services. It is also evidenced in the anti-money 
laundering  legislation  that  followed  the  Directive  of  26  October  2005  (Directive  2005/60  on  the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing 
as amended by Directive 2008/20 of 11 March 2008 as regards the implementing powers conferred on 
the Commission), which requires banks to collect information on their clients and their transactions and  
makes bank obligations dependent on their exposure to client risk. This has not however prevented ever 
more insidious interference, using the threat of primary money-laundering offences to spread well 
beyond its original anti-drug purpose to take in far less important offences. 
  
The trend does have its justification: the client's own interests, the public interest or the interest of the 
financial system as a whole. However, it is not only banks that are holding increasing amounts of 
information about us: the number of CCTV cameras in public places is multiplying, on some forms of 
public transport (e.g the Paris public transport system with its Navigo card) individuals' comings and 
goings are recorded, and the number of files held on us is growing in general. 
  
This is why legislation has been passed on the keeping of computer files. The French law on IT and 
freedom of 6 January 1978 (law 78-17 on IT, computer files and freedom) led the way, implementing the 
concept that the collection and use of personal data must be regulated and monitored.  Those same 
principles now underlie the rules that apply Europe-wide (e.g. Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995,  
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Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002, the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, in Germany the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (Federal Data Protection 
Act)  of  14  January  2003  (Bundesgesetzblatt  I,  66)  and  in  Luxembourg  the  amended  laws  of  
2 August 2002 and 30 May 2005).  
  
II.   Specific context  
  
Banking secrecy is recognised and protected.  It is based on the respect for private life and certain areas of 
public interest. It is not absolute and there are numerous exceptions to it, mainly in favour of public 
authorities authorised to exchange information. 
  
1.  Banking secrecy in Community and national law  
  
Banking secrecy is not enshrined in any particular Community law but Community directives do take it 
into account: the Directive of 6 May 2009 (arts. 2 and 5 of Directive 2009/44 amending article 3 of 
Directive 2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements) is just one example.  The ECJ 
also recognises its existence (ECJ 10 December 2002, Weduwe, C-153/00).  Banking secrecy is thus part 
of Community life, which is hardly surprising given that it is recognised and protected by the Member 
States. 
  
Treated as a matter of public policy in France (E. Collomp, Le secret  bancaire, French Cour de Cassation 
report 2004) and in Luxembourg (Cour d'appel, 2 April 1993, Bull. Droit et Banque,  2003, no. 34, p 52; Cour 
d'appel, 13 March 2002, Bull. Droit et Banque, 2002, no. 33, p 40; Cour de Cassation, 22 May 2003, Cour de 
Cassation, 18 March 2004, no. 2053: case law available on-line at www.codeplafi.lu under secret bancaire), 
banking secrecy is protected by law with penalties in the event of violation (art. L.511-33 and L.571-4 
French Monetary and Financial Code; art. 226-13 French Criminal Code; art. 41 Luxembourg Financial 
Sector Act of 5 April 1993 as amended; art. 458 of the Luxembourg Criminal Code, Grand Ducal Order 
of  24  March  1989).  In  2008  the  French  Parliament  also  passed  law  2008-776  of  4  August  2008 
modernising the economy (see Th. Bonneau, Apports concernant les marchés financiers in Dr. sociétés, November 
2008, no. 232) and making investment companies subject to professional secrecy (article L 531-12 
reproduces article L 511-33 of the Monetary and Financial Code) while recent order 2009-866 of 15 July 
2009 on the provision of payment services also makes the personnel and management of paying agents 
subject to the same obligation (article L.522-19 Monetary and Financial Code resulting from article 12 of 
the order).  In Germany banking secrecy is protected by a number of laws (cf. para. 1, sub-section 3, 
sentence 2 Federal Data Protection Act and section 30a of its implementing order) and is seen by the civil  
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courts as one of banks' primary duties to their clients (Bundesgerichtshof, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 2006, 
830, 834).  
  
In Luxembourg, banking secrecy is an obligation discharged by achievement of a result (see the above 
case law); and it is vigorously protected by the French courts.  In civil law, professional secrecy is a valid 
reason for non-disclosure, even if the bank incurs liability by refusing to do so (Cour de Cassation, 
chambre commerciale, 13 November 2003,  Banque et droit no. 94, March/April 2004, comment by Th. 
Bonneau; JCP 2004, ed. E, 736, no. 6, comment J Stoufflet; Rev dr bancaire et financier no. 4, July/August 
2004, comment by F-J Crédot and Y Gérard; Cour de Cassation, chambre commerciale, 25 January 2005, 
Bull civ., IV, no. 13, p. 12; Banque et droit no. 101, May/June 2005, 70, comment by Th. Bonneau; D. 2005, 
act. jurisp. 485, comment by V. Avena-Robardet; Rev dr bancaire et financier no. 2, March/April 2005, 12, 
comment by F-J Crédot and Y Gérard; Rev. trim. dr. com, 2005, 395, comment by D Legeais; JCP 2005, ed. 
E, 1676, no. 6, comment by AS; Cour de Cassation, chambre commerciale, 23 January 2007, Banque et droit 
no. 113, May/June 2007, 38, comment by Th. Bonneau).  
  
2. The private and public interests protected by banking secrecy  
  
Banking secrecy protects both public and private interests. 
  
The French courts place the emphasis on the protection of private interests (Cour de Cassation, chambre 
commerciale, 11 April 1995, Bull. civ. IV, no. 121, p. 197; Rev. dr. bancaire et bourse, no. 50, July/August 1995, 
145, comment by F-J Crédot and Y Gérard; Rev. trim. dr. com, 1995, 635, comment by M. Cabrillac; 
Quotidien juridique no. 51, 27 June 1995, 4; JCP 1996, ed. E, I. 525, no. 6 comment by Ch. Gavalda and  
J Stoufflet; D 1996, J. 573, comment by Matsopoulou; see Th. Bonneau Communication de pièces et secret 
bancaire (on the order handed down by the commercial division of the Cour de Cassation on 11 April 
1995), Rev. dr. bancaire et bourse no. 49, May/June 1994, 94) on the basis that banking secrecy protects 
clients.  We support this view on the grounds that banking secrecy is first and foremost an expression of 
the duty of loyalty and that once it is enshrined in law, "it becomes a personal right within society like any 
other:  respect  of  private  life,  the  family,  the  home  and  of  correspondence"  
(M. Contamine-Raynaud, Le secret bancaire et le contrôle de l'Etat sur les opérations de change et sur leurs effets délictuels, 
RIDC 1994, p. 487).  The same view is taken in Germany where the courts and legal writers see banking 
secrecy mainly as a way of protecting personal freedom (Bundesgerichtshof, Neue Juristische Wochenscrift 2006, 
830, 834; Canaris in Staub, Handelsgesetzbuch, 4th edition, 1988, Bankvertragsrecht at 41).  
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But banking secrecy does not protect only private interests.  It also protects public interests (Garabiol, 
previous paragraph) such as democracy and confidence (A. Teissier, Le secret professionnel du banquier, 
preface by G Di Marino, Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 1999, p. 265) and the economy since 
banking secrecy is "a political economic tool in that it can be used to attract capital to, or to retain it within, 
a country" (Teissier, ibid, p. 255). At the European level, banking secrecy as currently protected within a 
number of Member States certainly promotes the free movement of capital within the European Union.  
At the same time it encourages the free provision of services by the banks to clients in other Member 
States, thus contributing to the ever deeper integration of the single market (see above).   These public 
interests are not overlooked, as demonstrated by the positions adopted by the OCBF (French Bank 
Co-ordination  Office)  (OCBF,  Secret  bancaire,  in  Bulletin  d’information  12,  April  2000)  and  by  the 
Luxembourg financial supervisory authority (CSSF) whose committee of lawyers pointed out in a study 
published 1 March 2004 (CSSF 2004 annual report, page 196) that banking secrecy does not just protect 
the private life of clients but also the "authority of the profession and the trust relationship between the 
holders of the secrets and those protected". The committee concludes that a client cannot give his banker 
general and general release from the duty of secrecy without compromising "the general social interest" 
that the banker is also bound to protect. 
  
3.  Disclosure of information 
   
In a very large number of countries banking secrecy is a relative concept with exceptions that allow the 
disclosure of information to, for example, the criminal prosecution authorities (e.g. article L.511-33 
sub-section 2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code and paras. 160ff. of the German Code of 
Criminal Procedure).  In some cases disclosure is allowed to authorities such as the French Commission 
bancaire (see above) or to the domestic and foreign financial supervisory authorities (article 41(3) of the 
Luxembourg law of 5 April 1993 or para. 24c of the German Banking Supervisory Act). 
 
Exchanges of information between States have been organised at Community level since the Directive of 
3 June 2003 allowing the automatic exchange of information breaks with the Directive of 19 December 
1977 (Directive 77/799 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States 
in the field of direct taxation as amended by Directive 2004/106 of 16 November 2004) in that the 
Directive of 3 June 2003 allows only the automatic exchange of information, while the 19 December 1977 
Directive creates three types of exchange: on request (art. 2), automatic (art. 3), and voluntary (art. 4).  A 
fundamental difference is that exchange on request implements the principle but cannot be made without 
a specific reason. It is a break also because automatic exchange is limited to specific cases and must be 
ordered after a consultation procedure, while voluntary exchanges, which are not subject to prior request,  
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can only occur in specific, generally unusual, circumstances. Finally, it is a break because the 19 December 
1977 Directive sets limits that allow Member States to refuse to disclose information (art. 8). The 
Directive of 3 June 2003 does not diverge only from its 1977 predecessor, it also diverges from many 
other directives and in particular from the 14 June 2006 Banking Directive (Directive 2006/48 relating to 
the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions) which allows the exchange of information 
on request between Member State authorities (art. 132). 
  
The Directive of 3 June 2003 also runs contrary to article 26 of the OECD Tax Convention on Income 
and Capital which states that "countries are not at liberty to engage in 'fishing expeditions' or to request 
information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer. In formulating their 
requests, the requesting state should demonstrate the foreseeable relevance of the requested information. 
In addition, the requesting state should also have pursued all domestic means to access the requested 
information except those that would give rise to disproportionate difficulties" (OECD website, Article 26 
of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital). 
  
This view is shared by a number of Member States such as France and Germany.  
 
In  France,  exchanges  of  information  between  French  financial  authorities  or  with  their  foreign 
counterparts are on-request only (art. L.631-1 and L.631-2 Monetary and Financial Code; see also the 
charter between the Commission de contrôle des assurances and the Commission bancaire on co-operation in the 
control and exchange of information (arts. 12 and 13), Bull. officiel de la Banque de France no. 35, November 
2001, 27; the co-ordination agreement between the Commission bancaire and the Commission de contrôle des 
assurances, des mutuelles et institutions de prévoyance on supplementary monitoring of financial conglomerates, 
Bull. officiel de la Banque de France no. 86 February 2006, 21; the co-operation agreement between the 
Commission bancaire and the National Bank of Croatia on banking supervision (art. 9), Bull. officiel du CECEI 
et de la Commission bancaire no. 10, December 2008, 6; the OIVC multilateral agreement on consultation, 
co-operation and the exchange of information (art. 8), Bull. mens. COB no. 383, October 2003, 223.  See 
also the agreements signed by the Commission bancaire and the AMF quoted by Th. Bonneau in Droit 
bancaire, 7th edition, Montchrestien, no. 158-2 and note 151 by Th. Bonneau and F. Drummond, Droit des 
marchés financiers, 2nd edition, 2005, Economica, no. 1027 and page notes). Information can be exchanged 
voluntarily but in such cases and as many Community and European regulations have made it clear, it 
cannot be general, it must be justified, and it has to concern specific items of information (see articles 18 
and 19 of the co-ordination agreement between the Commission bancaire and the Commission de contrôle des 
assurances, des mutuelles et institutions de prévoyance on supplementary monitoring of financial conglomerates; 
article L.632-6 of the Financial and Monetary Code).  
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The German Federal Financial Services Authority (BaFin) can also access bank details (bank account 
master data: name of account holder etc.) but does not have access to details of account transactions 
(section 24c of the Banking Supervisory Act).  The fact that BaFin has direct access to these databases 
does  not  however  mean  that  it  can  use  the  facility  at  its  own  discretion.  On  13  June  2007  the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) ruled that BaFin cannot access the database 
without concrete, legitimate reason ("Under the terms of the regulation, accounts can be accessed only in 
the event of an actual Ermittlungsverfahren [judicial inquiry] or request for legal assistance that meets all legal 
requirements"; item 109)  ( http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen(rs20070613_1bvr15505.html). 
 
There are differences within Europe as regards the ability of fiscal authorities to obtain information from 
banks.  
 
The German tax authorities cannot request information from a bank unless they have been unable to 
obtain that information directly from the taxpayer ("unless a request for information from the taxpayer 
does not obtain the desired effect or is without effect", para. 93, sub-sections 1, 7, 8 and para. 93b of the 
Tax Code (Abgabenordnung) provided that they have concrete evidence that leads them to believe that 
the taxpayer's tax returns are incomplete or untruthful ("There must be sufficient basis for the request for 
information; fishing expeditions and computer surveillance are not allowed" – paras. 30a(2) and 93(1) Tax 
Code; see also the above 13 June 2007 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, no. 111ff).  In an 
internal circular (Anwendungserlass) the tax authorities recognised that they cannot blindly take action 
without good reason (AEAO, "Pursuant to section 93(7) AO, access to accounts for fiscal reasons is therefore only 
allowed for specific reasons.  It must be necessary for the specific case concerned and must relate to one 
specific person (no. 2.3 AEAO). Before the account is accessed, the person concerned must be given the opportunity to 
provide the information him/herself unless this would compromise the purpose of the disclosure" (no. 2.6 AEAO); see also 
marginal 37 of BVerfG, cited above).  
 
In France, the opening and closing of accounts must be reported to FICOBA (the register held by the tax 
office that records bank accounts) (art. 1649-A, General Tax Code; F Bordas, Devoirs professionnels des  
établissements de crédit, Secret bancaire, vol. 141, Juris-classeur, Banque-Crédit-Bourse, special 43). Although the 
French tax authorities can obtain a large number of documents (articles L.83 and L.85 of the Code of 
Fiscal Procedure), they can only investigate "specific matters; they cannot carry out general investigations". An order 
of 18 March 1988 sets out when they can exercise their right of investigation and states that "demands for 
very small amounts must be eliminated and the right to disclosure may not be exercised unless the taxpayer and bank client  
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has himself failed to provide that information to the authorities" (Bordas, Devoirs professionnels des établissements de crédit, 
secret bancaire, previous article, no. 50).  
  
The Luxembourg tax authorities have no right at all to investigate direct tax matters.  The Grand Ducal 
regulation of 24 March 1989 makes this perfectly clear: "Tax authorities may not require banks to disclose items 
of information on their clients unless allowed by the law of 28 January 1948 on the due collection of registration and succession 
tax" (article 1). 
  
Beyond these differences, none of these three countries allows the automatic and voluntary disclosure of 
information  to  the  tax  authorities  that  is  allowed  under  the  3  June  2003  Directive.  Exchange  of 
information with the tax or any other authorities is in all cases subject to specific reason.  
  
C.  The values and interests in conflict 
  
I.  Public interests and the principles of individual and economic freedom 
 
The exchanges of information and systems of mutual assistance introduced by Directives 77/799/EEC 
and 2003/48/EC are based on a clear dual public interest: the collection by the Member States of the 
taxes they have imposed and fiscal justice among taxpayers. Protecting that interest means setting up 
effective fiscal measures for combating tax fraud, imperatives that the ECJ recognises as "reasons of 
imperative general interest" (see ECJ, 18 December 2007, A, C-101/05, ECR 1-11531, item 555, and ECJ, 11 
October 2007, ELISA, C-451/05, ECR 1-8251, point 81) to which the EC Treaty also refers (art. 58.1.b).  
Whatever the importance of the interest in question, it must be set against other fundamental rights. 
  
Article 6, sub-sections 1 and 2 of the Treaty of the European Union state that: 
"The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. 
 
The Union respects the fundamental rights as warranted by the European convention on the safeguard of human rights 
and fundamental liberties signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from constitutional traditions common 
to Member States as the general principles of Community law."  
  
We must therefore consider firstly whether the safeguards provided for the public interest comply with 
the "principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law", the respect 
for private life being the most critical aspect of them.  
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Creating the basis for secondary legislation, this form of public interest must also be weighed against the 
objectives of the European Union and in particular its aim "to promote economic and social progress ... and to 
achieve balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers" (article 
2, Treaty on European Union). In other words, we must see to what extent the automatic and general 
exchange of information would be compatible with the freedoms underpinning the single market and the 
free movement of capital and services in particular. 
  
Do we also need to measure the legality of such a system directly against the banking secrecy yardstick, i.e. 
after we have already taken account of the respect for private life that is its prime basis? Such a test does 
not seem necessary unless banking secrecy is a stand-alone value requiring separate protection or, in 
Community law terms, it is a general principle of Community law. 
  
A comparison with the professional secrecy imposed on lawyers shows that this is not the case although 
that form of secrecy is of importance. The ECJ considers it only within the context of the fundamental 
rights it must protect and more specifically of the right of the individual to a fair trial (ECJ, 26 June 2007, 
C-305/05, point 29.  For procedural reasons only the ECJ ignored the second aspect, respect for private 
life, which was highlighted by the Advocate General, point 18 of the above order). Since lawyers must 
under certain circumstances disclose suspicions of money laundering, their professional duty of secrecy is 
not recognised as a general overriding principle. Only fundamental rights (in this case the right to a fair 
trial) are, in the ECJ's view, values that can be balanced against the fight against money laundering and 
that  can,  in  certain  circumstances,  render  the  limitation  of  professional  secrecy  unlawful  (cf.  the 
conclusions of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in C-305/05, no. 38). 
  
The same conclusion applies to banking secrecy. Now subject to the automatic exchange of information, 
banking secrecy is not of itself an argument that can prevail over the public interest on which such 
exchanges are based.  However, its underlying principles cannot be ignored. 
  
There must be a proper balance between these public interests and the principles of individual freedom 
(shielded by the respect for private life and personal data protection) and of economic freedom, the latter 
forming the basis for the single market. When establishing that balance, due consideration must be given 
to whether it is imperative to sacrifice the private to the public interest or whether that sacrifice is out of 
proportion to the objective pursued. Both criteria apply when resolving conflicts of values and interests 
protected by the European Convention on the Safeguard of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties 
and also to the main thinking behind Community law as this is translated into article 5 EC.  
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 II.   Respect for private life and personal data protection  
  
1.  The right to respect for private life and personal data protection   
  
When opening a bank account, clients must first provide the bank with details of their identity, address, 
marital status and job. As we have pointed out, throughout the business relationship the bank will collect 
a lot of other personal information about the client.  Anti-money laundering laws require banks actively to 
collect information in areas that are increasing in scope along with the legislation itself, as demonstrated 
by the Directive of 26 October 2005. The 21 April 2004 MIFID Directive similarly requires banks to 
collect all the data needed to assess their clients' assets and to classify them by investment profile. 
  
Private banks, from which clients expect professional advice and assistance in the management of all or 
part of their assets, will of course have even greater information on their clients that will often be of an 
extremely intimate nature. 
  
Fundamental liberties include respect for private life and the protection of that life as regards the 
processing and circulation of personal data. The rights are specifically enshrined in the 4 November 1950 
European Convention on the Safeguard of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, whose article 8(1) 
states that: 
 
"1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence". 
  
In a dynamic interpretation of this provision, the European Court of Human Rights has made the respect 
for private life a concrete and effective reality (ECHR, 9 October 1979, Airey in F. Sudre, J-P Margénaud, 
J Andriantsimbazovina, A. Gouttenoire, M. Levinet, Les Grands arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, 
PUF, Thémis, 2nd. ed., 2004, GACEDH no. 2). It has also not hesitated to extend the scope of 
protection to include the individual's social relations (ECHR, 16 Dec. 1992, Niemetz v Allemagne, Les 
Grands arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme no. 40 in which the ECHR held that the harm caused 
to the professional secrecy binding lawyers was out of proportion to the legitimate aim pursued). ECHR 
case law evidences a particular sensitivity to the saving and/or disclosure of personal data that could lead 
to the secret surveillance of citizens with the "risk of enfeebling, if not destroying democracy on the grounds that it is 
being defended" (ECHR, 6 Sep. 1978, Klass v. Germany, A.29 ibid, no. 18; ECHR, 5 May 2000, Rotaru v 
Romania).  
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The ECHR holds that personal data, which it sees as being of "fundamental importance" to the enjoyment of 
the right to respect for private life, cannot be disclosed without the permission of the interested party 
unless it is in the "fundamental public interest" and is accompanied by proper and sufficient guarantees, and 
by judicial control in particular, that the data will not be misused (ECHR, Rotaru ibid; ECHR, 25 Feb. 
1997, Z v Finland; JCP G 1998, I, 107, no. 35, chron, F Sudre). 
 
These principles apply in full within the Community. The European Court of Justice has made specific 
reference to the Convention and has adopted the ECHR interpretation of article 8 (ECJ, 26 June 1980, 
136/79, National Panasonic v Commission; ECJ 1980, ECR 2033, pt. 17). The duty to protect personal 
data underlies Directives 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 and 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002, which the 
ECJ  has  also  made  strictly  subject  to  the  Convention  (ECJ,  20  May  2003,  C-465/00,  C-138/01, 
Rechnungshof, Österreichischer Fundfunk: RTDH 2004, p. 724, comments by C Maubernard). In the 
view of the ECJ, "fundamental rights form an integral part of the general legal principles protected by the Court of Justice" 
(ECJ, 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70: ECJ 1970, ECR 1125).  If "the 
protection of these rights through the basis of constitutional traditions common to all Member States must be provided through 
the Community's organisations and aims", they cannot be superseded by secondary law. 
 
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights restates these principles: article 7 provides that "Everyone 
has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications" and article 8 that "Everyone has 
the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her" anticipating the wording of the European 
Constitution. 
  
2.  Disproportionate harm to private life  
  
In order to protect the individual against arbitrary interference in his private life by public authorities, 
article 8(2) of the European Convention on the Safeguard of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties  
provides that: 
 
"There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others". 
  
Combating capital flight and tax evasion are certainly legitimate aims under this rule, since their purpose 
is to ensure "the economic well-being of the country" but we have yet to see whether, in the light of this objective,  
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the automatic exchange of information allowed under Directive 2003/48/EC is a necessity and not 
disproportionate interference. 
 
Necessity must be demonstrated at a practical, not simply theoretical, level. The ECJ does not for 
example allow Member States to process the personal data of citizens who are not their own nationals in 
order to combat crime (ECJ, 16 December 2008, Huber v Germany, C-524/06). 
 
When considering the proportionate nature of such measures, the ECJ, like the ECHR, will look at 
whether "a proper balance" is maintained between the general interest and the interests of the individual (e.g. 
ECHR, Klass, 6 September 1978, A.28, section 59 on the secret surveillance of citizens' correspondence 
and telecommunications in order to fight against terrorism). The need to achieve a balance between the 
lawful objective and the means used to achieve it are "at the heart of the control of the margin the European courts 
allow the Member States when applying national restrictions to protected rights" (JCI Europe, file 6525, by F Sudre). 
 
One interesting precedent is worthy of note: a French anti-fraud law that gave customs officers the right 
to enter homes and seize documents. In a series of three judgments made in one day (Miaihe v France,  
25 February 1993, app. 10588/83; Funke v France, 25 February 1993, app. 12661/87, and Cremieux v 
France,  25  February  1993,  app.  11471/85)  the  ECHR  ruled  firstly  that  such  legislation  and  its 
implementation must provide "proper and sufficient guarantees against misuse".  Holding that there had been 
significant interference, the Court said that there are no such guarantees if seizures are "en-masse and 
especially general"  and  that  there  had  been  a  breach  of  article  8.  Is  not  the  automatic  exchange  of 
information when there is no real risk that the taxpayer concerned will not meet his fiscal obligations 
totally "general" and "en-masse"? Using this system to ensure that interest on savings is properly taxed is a 
particularly serious violation of the respect for private life, given that the law does not allow its use for 
other equally important public imperatives, such as the stability of the financial system. 
 
As one writer has said, "the scale of values depends on how we view life within society.  It will be different in a totalitarian 
State from in a democratic State since human rights and human freedoms will not be viewed in the same way, because the 
importance placed on professional secrecy essentially depends on the importance society places on the individual and the 
protection of his personality".  (P Lambert, Le secret professionel, Nemesis, Brussels, 1985, p. 37). 
 
We believe it is at least very debatable in a Europe setting itself up as the cradle of fundamental human 
rights whether the interference in private life caused by the automatic exchange of information as allowed 
under Directive 2003/48/EC complies with the principle of proportionality.  Claiming that it does 
(whereases 10 and 26 without any grounds) is theory rather than practice and is unconvincing.  
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 III.  The freedoms underlying the single market  
  
It may appear surprising to wish to check whether a Directive meets the principles of freedom underlying 
the single market. Do not these principles apply only to the Member States, prohibiting them from raising 
barriers within the single market? 
 
This is certainly an interesting question given that the automatic exchange of information would do away 
with  the  withholding  at  source  still  allowed  under  Directive  2003/48/EC.  The  argument  that  the 
automatic exchange of information might prejudice the free movement of capital and services is of 
relevance here (article 5, TUE) and leads to the following examination. 
  
1.  The restrictive nature of the automatic exchange of information  
  
(a) Article 49 EC, introducing the freedom to provide services (FPS) prohibits any action that would 
render the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services 
within a single Member State (ECJ 28 April 1998, Safir, C-118/96, ECR I-1897, point 23,; ECJ 4 March 
2004, Commission v France, C-334/02, ECR I-2229, point 23 and ECJ, 11 September 2007, Commission 
v Germany, C-318/05, ECR I-6957, point 81).  The ECJ has several time applied FPS to the financial 
sector (ECJ, 10 May 1995, Alpine Investments BV, C-384/93; ECJ, 14 November 1995, Svensson, 
C-484/93 and ECJ, 3 October 2006, Fidum Finanz, C-452/04). 
 
In a very recent case on a national law introduced to fight tax fraud by persons investing some of their 
savings with banks in another Member State, the ECJ decided that applying to assets held outside the 
Member State of residence rules different from those applying to assets held with a local bank could 
"make it less attractive for taxpayers to transfer their assets to another Member State in order to benefit from the financial 
services offered there than to keep those assets and obtain financial services in the Netherlands", their Member State of 
residence  (ECJ,  11  June  2009,  C-155/08  and  C-157/08,  point  39).  The  Court  concluded  that  the 
legislation "constitutes a restriction on the free provision of services and on the free movement of capital and is prohibited in 
principle by articles 49 EC and 56 EC" (ibid, point 40). 
 
It seems indisputable that introducing a solution under which banks that manage non-resident savings 
must set up a system for the automatic exchange information will make it more difficult for them to offer 
transborder services. They will firstly come up against the natural resistance European clients have to 
such systems (for restrictions and capital flows, see below).  Managing the system will also generate a cost  
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that will not apply to asset management for resident clients. The result will be that transborder business 
will be subject to constraints that are contrary to FPS and whose cost will rise the greater the bank's 
percentage of European asset management clients. Banks in small countries like Luxembourg will be 
much harder hit than banks in countries with a large domestic market. 
 
(b)  Investment by European citizens of some of their savings with banks outside the Member State in 
which they are resident produces capital flows within the meaning of articles 56ff EC in line with the 
principle of the free movement of capital.  Directive 2003/48/EC aims to ensure that interest on savings 
income is taxed in the beneficiary's country of residence under the rules that apply there. The Directive 
may therefore impact the movement of capital within the European Union, as its reference to articles 
56-60 of the EC Treaty makes clear.  It is generally agreed that the prohibition contained in article 56 of 
the EC Treaty applies only to national laws and regulations passed by a Member State but as we have 
already commented, the test of whether the automatic exchange of information justifiably restricts these 
movements is simply a proposal being made here. 
 
Well-established ECJ case law extends the prohibition to indirect restrictions that do not stop financial 
transfers or associated legal transactions but can be dissuasive, particularly by making capital movements 
more expensive.  Simply the risk of such dissuasion is held to be sufficient (ECJ, 16 March 1999, Manfred 
Trummer and Peter Mayer, C-222/97; ECR I-7587, point 18).  Tax rules are continuing to expand this 
case law, in which the ECJ has kept an open mind on what constitutes a prohibited restriction. 
 
In the above 11 June 2009 judgment, the ECJ held that a law passed by a Member State setting a 
seven-year recovery period for assets held outside its borders and at the same time imposing fraud 
penalties (if applicable) over that entire period time restricted the free movement of capital.  It decided 
that the law in question materially reduced the time in which a taxpayer can benefit from the legal security 
he can expect from a limitation of the recovery period. 
 
A similar approach would not be inappropriate to the automatic exchange of information on savings held 
in a bank outside the depositor's Member State of residence. Whatever the circumstances and reasons 
causing people to wish to have part of their assets managed in another Member State, this information 
system  could  cause  them  to  draw  back  because  it  creates  a  circle  of  information  whose  size  and 
consequences they cannot understand.  This dissuasive effect is especially clear in that Europe as a whole 
places no similar constraint on assets invested in banks in the investor's country of residence and the 
restriction itself is not imposed by most Member States. 
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To conclude, the automatic exchange of information restricts the free provision of services and the free 
movement of capital.  In the following we will consider whether this restriction, created by a Community 
Directive, is justified by the exceptions allowed under the EC Treaty or by reasons of imperative general 
interest. 
  
2.  Reasons for restricting the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital  
  
The EC Treaty specifically allows certain restrictions on the movement of capital. It allows Member 
States to "apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation 
with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested" and to "take all requisite 
measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation" (art. 58(1)(a) and 
(b), EC Treaty). 
 
This must be set against the need to combat tax fraud and to ensure that fiscal controls are effective.  The 
ECJ  considers  these  "reasons of imperative general interest"  able  to  restrict  the  freedoms  of  movement 
enshrined in the EC Treaty (ECJ, 18 December 2007, A, C-101/05, ECR I-11531 point 555 and ECJ, 11 
October 2007, ELISA, C-451/05, ECR I-8251, point 81). 
 
However this does not mean that the restriction can be based on a general presumption of tax evasion or 
tax  fraud  (ECJ,  17  July  1997,  Leur-Bloem,  C-28/95,  ECR  I-4161,  point  44).  This  has  led  to  the 
invalidation of a Belgian law preventing the purchase by Belgian residents of foreign debt securities (ECJ, 
26 September 2000, Commission v Belgium, C-478/98, ECR I-7587, point 45). 
  
But is this not the justification also used to support the general and automatic exchange of information? 
  
A rather subtler approach appears to have been taken in the 11 June 2009 judgment. When considering 
the disputed Dutch law (extended recovery period and extension of the period of time to which any fine 
will apply), the Court distinguished between taxable items that are concealed from the tax authorities in 
the country of taxation so that there is no evidence of the existence of the items that would enable the 
authorities to begin an investigation, and situations in which the Member State  imposing the restriction 
does have evidence that such items exist in another Member State and is therefore able to begin an 
investigation.  In this particular case, the Court decided that the former situation applied and that "in these 
circumstances, subjecting taxable items concealed from the tax authorities to a twelve-year extended recovery period does not go 
beyond what is necessary to ensure the efficacy of fiscal controls and to combat tax fraud" (point 70).  It also observed that 
since the aim was not to enable the authorities in the Member State concerned to obtain information  
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from the Member State in which the savings were held (Luxembourg) "it is not ... necessary to know if banking 
secrecy applies in the latter" (point 68).  
  
The Court's reasoning is not the simplest to follow and is essentially based on the fact that since there was 
no evidence that a Dutch taxpayer held any financial assets in a foreign bank, the recovery period could 
have been extended to give the Dutch authorities more time to obtain from the Member State in which 
the  bank  was  located  information  that  would  allow them to start legal action (points 66 and 67).  
Consequently the extended period was not too long for the request for information.  It only means that "a 
longer period was allowed during which discovery of taxable items could have given rise to recovery so long as the investigation 
that followed the discovery led to recovery before the period ended" (point 67). The fact that the twelve-year recovery 
period was set "on the basis of the time allowed for tax fraud procedures" was enough for the Court to consider it 
not disproportionately long (point 69). In other words, the Netherlands cannot automatically obtain from 
Luxembourg (or Germany) information on accounts held by taxpayers who are subject to its laws 
allowing restrictions on the free movement of capital and services. 
 
We believe this is rather too succinct a manner of demonstrating the need to apply restrictions in the face 
of an alleged imperative reason and its proportionality. If the recovery period can be extended only in one 
simple eventuality (the Dutch tax authorities by chance happened to discover the existence of items that 
no-one other than the taxpayer who concealed them need disclose) the need, let alone the usefulness, of 
this measure must remain dubious. 
 
The inconvenience caused to taxpayers in terms of legal security is on the other hand far from negligible, 
meaning that the restriction does not appear to be proportionate. It is regrettable that the case did not 
lead to any written conclusions by the Advocate General but this may be an indication of the low 
importance placed on it by the Court. 
  
So what should we conclude from our consideration of whether the restriction on the free movement of 
capital and services imposed by the automatic and general exchange of information is justified? 
  
The system appears to be based on the assumption that European taxpayers make dishonest declarations 
to the tax authorities about the interest they receive on their savings deposited with banks in Member 
States outside their country of residence.  Standard ECJ case law maintains that restrictions cannot be 
based on such assumptions. Yet the Court now seems to take the view that the introduction of automatic 
exchange of information as provided in Directive 2003/48/EC would offer a very effective way of  
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combating tax fraud, and from here to declaring that the system does not go beyond its stated objective is 
but one small step. 
  
To conclude, in the light of fundamental human rights and of the specific harm that would be caused to 
private life, the automatic exchange of information should not be allowed. Although there is no evidence 
that the system is compatible with the freedoms inherent in the single market, its use might be justified by 
the imperative need to combat tax fraud and to ensure that fiscal controls are effective, an area in which 
the ECJ does not always apply very thorough tests of proportionality.. 
  
D.  The proper balance between the public interest and respect for private life 
 
The serious harm an automatic information system can do to the respect for private life means that we 
must consider whether the purpose of Directive 2003/48/EC could not be obtained by any other less 
invasive but possibly equally effective methods. 
  
Two solutions immediately spring to mind: the exchange of information on request as provided under 
both Directive 77/799/EEC and the OECD Tax Convention on Income and Capital (article 26), and 
withholding at source in the country in which the savings are held, most of which revenue would be paid 
to  the  taxpayer's  Member  State  of  residence,  a  method  that  Directive  2003/48/EC  allows  as  a 
(temporary) alternative to the automatic exchange of information. 
  
The acceptability of the latter solution in terms of respect for private life must be considered in the light 
of the effectiveness of other, far more respectful, systems. In other words, the harm done to respect for 
private life by a system of blind automatic exchange of information is made all the more unacceptable by 
the fact that (a) there is no clear evidence that it is more effective in taxing interest income and (b) the 
current system of exchange on request, which does respect private life, is preferable. 
  
I.    The automatic exchange of information is of doubtful economic benefit 
  
There is little proof that the automatic exchange of information is better than withholding at source, 
indeed quite the opposite is true (see reports and documents at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/savings_directive_review/i
ndex_en.htm.  
In a report to the Council of 15 September 2008 ([SEC (2008) 2420] p. 4) the European Commission 
seeks to be reassuring when it declares that "The Directive has proven effective within the limits set by its scope. It has  
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also had indirect, non measurable, positive results in enhancing taxpayers' compliance with their obligations to declare interest 
income."  
(http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/sav
ings_directive_review/COM(2008)552_en.pdf). 
 
We have searched in vain for evidence to support this statement in the report itself and in the impact 
study produced for the amendment of the Directive and published 13 November 2008 [SEC (2008) 2767].  
In this, the Commission admits that it has been unable to obtain the data needed to carry out a serious 
assessment of the Directive and that data is lacking on the exchange of information in particular. It is 
therefore at present impossible to obtain any clear understanding of how much tax revenue the automatic 
exchange of information generates or even how the tax authorities use the information they receive.  It 
therefore cannot be ruled out that such exchanges will have made an only minor contribution to the 
Directive's ultimate aim of "bringing about effective taxation of interest payments in the beneficial owner's Member 
State" (Directive 2003/48/EC, whereas 14). 
 
That exchange has also given rise to expense is certain. The details provided by the Commission are 
incomplete here too (point 2.3, Impact Report) but the empirical study conducted by the European 
Policy Forum under Graham Mather and Keith Boyfield (Graham Mather & Keith Boyfield, Challenges 
Facing the EU Savings Tax, 2008) is more instructive. A huge survey of 1243 EU and Swiss banks has 
shown that compliance with the Directive has cost them €753 million to set up, plus €693 million each 
year to run. The writers estimate that extending the scope of the Directive as the Commission wishes 
would double the cost. 
 
The Commission is also for the moment silent about whether the automatic exchange of information has 
led to a flight of capital to third countries where they will be beyond the reach of all European tax. 
 
All this sets one thinking, particularly since withholding at source has no equal in terms of economic 
effectiveness.  Not requiring the banks (paying agents) to set up complex information disclosure systems, 
it also ensures the efficient collection of tax on all applicable revenues. Since the system is managed 
directly by the banks, Member States enjoy the fiscal benefit at absolutely no cost to themselves. Could 
this be the reason why the vast majority of Member States tax savings income by withholding at source?  
In other words, the Member States do not consider the solution preferred by the Directive effective 
enough to be used to tax savings held within their own national boundaries. So how can it be effective to 
tax savings held in a bank in another Member State?   
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II.   The security provided by withholding at source and/or exchange of information on request 
  
Withholding at source implies no threat to private life. This is because the tax is collected in the country 
in which the savings revenue is transparently generated so that there is no need for the transfer of account 
holder details to the country of residence. Withholding not only protects the private lives of individuals 
but also promotes transborder transactions within the EU and consequently the free movement of capital 
and professional services. The automatic exchange of information creates indirect barriers to these 
freedoms.  By enabling individuals to benefit from differing tax systems, withholding at source prevents 
the massive outflow of capital from Europe.   
  
Exchange  of  information  on  request  also  respects private  life.  Requests  are  subject  to  conditions, 
compliance with which can be examined by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Requests for information 
can be examined in administrative procedures subject to appeal.  By contrast, the automatic exchange of 
information offers no such guarantees and are not subject to any a priori control, while ex-post control is 
little more than a fiction. Once the information has been disclosed, the harm has essentially been done.  It 
is extremely hard to prevent misuse of such a system that itself is very likely to cause disproportionate 
harm to private life. 
 
The two systems can be implemented independently of each other.  It is however true that withholding at 
source cannot prevent fraud that is unconnected with the withholding system or that is caused by a 
fraudulent transaction. But since this type of fraud is rare and cannot be presumed, it does not of itself 
justify the introduction of the automatic exchange of information but could justify a combination of 
withholding at source and exchange upon request. 
 
E.   Conclusion 
 
Respect for private life does not prevent fiscal justice, which can easily be assured by withholding at 
source and payment of the tax to the country of residence of the interest beneficiary.  It is true that the 
amount of the withholding may seem insufficient to some Member States but is that sufficient reason to 
generalise  a  system  for  exchanging  information  that  causes  material  harm  to  the  private  life  of 
Europeans?  We do not believe it does, because Member States can deal with fiscal disparities before they 
occur.  Furthermore, at a time when the desire is for Europeans to be able to carry out transactions freely 
across Europe, whatever the place of execution might be, is it reasonable to allow countries of residence 
to track those transactions wherever they go?  Economic freedom must join the right to a private life and 
enjoy the same respect at all times. I 
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